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This paper focuses on the effects of domestic and international remit-
tances on child labor and schooling. Using data from the 1992–1993
and 1997–1998 Vietnam Living Standards Surveys, we investigate
school attendance and child labor in remittance recipient and non-
recipient households. The results of our binomial logit and two-sided
censored regression panel analysis indicate that remittances increase
schooling and reduce child labor. Although international remittances
are found to have a stronger beneficial impact than domestic remit-
tances in the cross-section, the panel analysis, taking account of fixed
effects, reverses this result, showing that the only significant impact
stems from domestic remittances.
INTRODUCTION
Remittances have risen enormously in recent decades, becoming a key
source of external income for households of many developing countries.
Remittances increase the well-being of receivers by easing consumption,
investment, and the accumulation of human capital. Remittances can also
have negative side effects, discouraging work of adults in receiving house-
holds and reducing care and supervision of children left behind.
While plenty of evidence is available on the role of international
remittances for household decisions, less attention has been paid to
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domestic remittances. We aim at contributing to fill this gap. We focus
on children, analyzing the impact of remittances on schooling and child
labor of children left behind. We study Vietnam, using the panel data
gathered in 1992–1993 and 1997–1998 Vietnam Living Standards Sur-
veys (VLSS). The use of panel data allows us to overcome some of the
common estimation problems encountered when studying migration and
remittances. Our estimation strategy, based on the use of fixed-effects
models, reveals some new features concerning the relative role of domestic
and international remittances for household decisions.
The literature on the effects of remittances on household decisions is
large and continuously growing. One of the main questions addressed,
both theoretically and empirically, is whether remittances are spent more
on consumption or more on investment in physical and human capital
(Rapoport and Docquier 2006). In this field of research, the prominent
role of remittances for investment on children’s education has been
assessed for several developing countries (Adams and Cuecuecha 2010,
2013). If remittances have a positive effect on children’s education, they
may also contribute to reduce child labor. From a theoretical point of
view, the simplest way to incorporate remittances in a household model is
to treat them as an additional income source. In this case, if parents’ deci-
sion to rely on child labor is due to the necessity of meeting the most
basic household needs and is not the result of a selfish attitude — namely
if the “luxury axiom” holds (Basu and Van 1998)1 — an increase in
income due to remittances is likely to release parents from the necessity of
employing their children in family farm and/or business activities and/or
sending them to work in the labor market. As for the effect on schooling,
in a simple theory of allocation of child time, schooling and leisure are
normal goods that jointly increase as income rises, leading to a reduction
in child labor. In this sense, even if the relationship between child labor
and schooling might become more complex, remittance inflows can play a
role as extra income, with beneficial effects for children. This relationship
also depends on the definition of child labor (if it includes, for example,
domestic chores or not). The literature on the allocation of time within
the households provides many theoretical and empirical examples where
these two activities might be complementary (see, for a survey, Edmonds
2008).
1This axiom states that: “A family will send the children to the labor market only if the
family’s income from non-child labor sources drops very low.” (Basu and Van 1998, 416).
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An increasing number of empirical findings seem to confirm the
beneficial effects produced by remittances. Cox Edwards and Ureta
(2003), for example, examine the effects of remittances from abroad on
households’ schooling decisions using data from El Salvador and find
that remittances have a large significant effect on school retention. How-
ever, in another recent study on El Salvador, Acosta (2011) does not
find a significant overall impact of remittances on schooling, when con-
trolling for endogeneity. Yang (2008) finds that increased receipt of
overseas remittances due to favorable exchange rate movements in the
Philippines increases child schooling and educational expenditure, while
reducing child labor. Dimova, Epstein, and Gang (2011), using Living
Standards Measurement Survey data on the Kagera region in Tanzania,
find empirical support for the hypothesis that both emigration and
remittances reduce child labor. In a theoretical model of child labor,
Epstein and Kahana (2008) show that the remittances sent by the emi-
grating parents might enable not only their children, but also others, to
stop working.
With respect to the distinction between domestic and international
remittances, the few studies undertaken so far show that international
remittances tend to have a stronger impact than domestic remittances.
Joseph and Plaza (2010), for Ghana, find that international remittances
unambiguously reduce child labor while domestic remittances have no
impact, and Antman (2012), for Mexico, find that paternal US migration
significantly increases girls’ schooling, while paternal domestic migration
has no significant effect. In both papers, these results are interpreted as
evidence that migrant parents are likely to be earning more if they have
migrated abroad rather than internally, and, therefore, that remittances
from international migration are more likely to improve child schooling
outcomes.
At variance with these findings, a number of applied studies present
less positive evidence on the relationship between migration and child
well-being, highlighting the negative side effects of international migra-
tion. The study by Giannelli and Mangiavacchi (2010), for Albania,
shows that parents’ migration can have a negative effect on school atten-
dance in the long term, mainly because of a lack of parental care for chil-
dren left behind. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2010) find that, although
remittances promote overall children’s school attendance in the Domini-
can Republic, migration has a negative impact on the school attendance
of children in migrant households. For Mexico, the evidence is mixed.
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The study by McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) reaches conclusions similar
to the preceding paper for schooling of girls and boys in rural areas, while
Antman (2012) finds a differential effect of father’s absence, with no
effect on boys, and a positive effect on girls.
In this paper, we define child labor and schooling as the proportion
of children aged six to 15 in the household who do at least some work
(paid or unpaid, for the family or for the market), and the proportion
of children who are only engaged in schooling, respectively. We embrace
the assumption, typical of the most part of the literature, that parents
care about their children’s education, spending some of their income and
time supporting their children’s school attendance and trying to avoid or
limit child labor. Income and time become complementary factors in a
child’s well-being, with parents devoting time to looking after their chil-
dren and considering how to spend money for them. Income from inter-
national remittances, instead, is hardly a complement of parental time
for children left behind. Since parents who have migrated abroad nor-
mally have fewer opportunities to visit their families as compared to par-
ents who have migrated internally, international migrants are likely to
have less control on the use of remittances at home. As a consequence,
international remittances may turn out to be less effective than domestic
remittances in improving the well-being of children left behind. Hence,
the distinction between domestic and international remittances may
reveal that the positive effect of remittances on child well-being is coun-
terbalanced by the negative effect of having distant parents who have
migrated abroad. In this regard, Vietnam is a particularly suitable coun-
try for our analysis, since foreign migration is mostly directed toward the
United States, quite a distant country in terms of both geographical loca-
tion and culture.
From the methodological point of view, we deal with the problem
of endogeneity due to unobservable characteristics by taking advantage of
panel data. Panel data on international migration and remittances in
developing countries are relatively rare. Of the 50 studies reviewed in
Adams (2011), only five use panel household data.
To investigate the direction of the potential bias arising from omit-
ted variables, we first perform a cross-sectional analysis. The results con-
firm previous cross-sectional evidence for other countries that
international remittances have a positive and significant impact on chil-
dren’s welfare. However, in Vietnam this result is likely to be biased by
the endogeneity of the migration decision, namely by specific unobserved
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factors associated with international migration, which are especially rele-
vant in this country where migration has strong political roots. To tackle
the problem of endogeneity, we use the two panel rounds and apply two-
sided censoring regression with fixed effects. This appears to be a sensible
strategy, since the findings turn out to be reversed. In fact, controlling for
time-invariant unobserved characteristics highlights the greater importance
of domestic remittances for child labor and schooling, while international
remittances become insignificant.
THE CASE OF VIETNAM
During the crucial decade of the 1990s, Vietnam experienced a sharp
increase in economic growth rates and a dramatic drop in overall poverty
(Dollar 2004) which yielded significant welfare gains for Vietnamese chil-
dren (Edmonds and Turk 2004). At the same time, Vietnam’s migration
and remittance patterns reshaped and expanded, both internally and inter-
nationally (Nguyen 2009).
The beginning of this economic transformation can be roughly asso-
ciated with the introduction of the Doi Moi policy in 1986, a plan of
comprehensive economic innovations and liberalizations. Although these
achievements varied significantly across households and regions, there were
overall improvements in many economic and social indicators. The pro-
portion of people living under the poverty line fell from over 50 percent
in the early 1990s to 37 percent at the end of the decade (Glewwe, Koch,
and Nguyen 2004), the prevalence of underweight children declined on
average by 1.1 percent every year (Khan et al. 2007), and child labor
declined and school enrollment rates increased (Nguyen 2009).
Evidence shows that migration patterns played a central role in
Vietnam’s development, with the flow of remittances increasing in quan-
tity and changing in terms of provenance. After the collapse of the Soviet
Union, different areas of the world were chosen by Vietnamese emigrants
as new destinations, including Asia, the Middle East, and especially the
United States. The large flow of migrants toward the United States has its
roots in the effective migration network created by a large community of
Vietnamese immigrants, who started to settle down there in 1975, when,
at the end of the Vietnam War, many people who had worked closely
with the Americans fled the new Socialist regime for fears of reprisals. For
these reasons, even if international migration in the 1990s was substan-
tially driven by economic pull factors, its origins were mainly political.
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Remittances from North America increased from around 40 percent
of total remittances at the beginning of the 1990s to almost 60 percent in
1998. The expansion of the flow of Vietnamese emigrants to Arab and
Asian non-traditional markets also reflected the new Vietnamese “open-
door” approach, which led to the creation of the Department for Overseas
Labor Management, in order to facilitate, implement, and supervise labor
export agreements with overseas markets.
Evidence shows that the remittance inflows also became more stable,
outstripped the Official Development Assistance (ODA), and almost
matched the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows, as the main and
most reliable source of foreign financial inflow for the country. However,
as will be shown in the next section, in the same decade the flow of
domestic remittances also increased considerably.
One of the most positive outcomes of the socioeconomic transi-
tion undertaken by Vietnam in the 1990s was an impressive reduction
in the participation of children in the national labor force, coupled
with a dramatic increase in their school enrollment rates. Although in
that decade the improvements were particularly impressive, universal
primary education has always been one of the main concerns of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam since the very first years of independence
and the political and ideological commitment of the socialist govern-
ment had enabled the country to reach a proportion of 86 percent of
children officially attending primary school by 1990 (Edmonds and
Turk 2004). In 1991, the government also issued a new law, specifi-
cally aimed at reinforcing this positive trend, the Law on the Univer-
salization of Education. Additionally, in the revised Constitution of
1992, a strong emphasis was placed on primary education, defined as
“both free and compulsory.”
DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
We use the first two waves of the VLSS, conducted by the General Statistics
Office of Vietnam, in the framework of the World Bank’s Household Liv-
ing Standards Measurement Surveys. The data for the first VLSS were col-
lected from October 1992 to October 1993 and covered 4,800 households,
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while the second round was undertaken from December 1997 to December
1998 with a sample of 6,002 households of which 4,305 were also inter-
viewed in 1992–1993 (World Bank 2000, 2001).2 We focus on the rates of
school attendance and on the incidence of child labor among children aged
six to 15 and perform both cross-sectional and panel analyses.
We select, for our purposes, the households that have at least one
child aged six to 15 and that provide us with the relevant information on
child schooling and labor. These include 2,930 households in 1993 and
2,739 households in 1998, respectively. We select from the panel 2,054
households, those with children in the chosen age range in both years.
We conduct our cross-sectional and panel analyses on the sample of panel
households.
Table 1 shows an increase in the percentage of households receiving
remittances over the 1990s. Domestic remittances reach a much larger
number of families, compared to international remittances, but the value
of international remittance inflows is far higher. However, the share of
the value of domestic remittances increases by 10 percentage points from
1993 to 1998.
Table 2 shows a sharp rise in the proportion of children only going
to school, coupled with a decline in the proportion of children only work-
ing. Girls work more than boys, but we observe a noticeable reduction in
gender differences, especially among children only working.
Gender differences, however, may arise because of a “sibling effect,”
according to which the probability of working or going to school of a
child may depend on gender and work/schooling of either an older or
younger sibling. For example, Edmonds (2006) finds for Nepal that, at
the modal birth spacing, the younger girl works more than her older
brother.
Table 3 gives some insight into this issue for Vietnam. In household
with mixed-gender school-age children, oldest children of either gender
always have a higher (lower) probability of working (schooling) than the
next oldest siblings, and females always have a higher (lower) probability
of working (schooling), irrespective of the number of children in the
household. The number of children in the household, however, con-
tributes to increase (reduce) the probability of work (schooling). So it
2We were not able to use the 2002 and 2004 rounds of the survey since the information
on migration and remittances is substantially reduced and changed. For data consistency,
we were therefore forced to limit the analysis to 1993 and 1998.
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seems that, for Vietnam, we should expect age, gender, and number of
school-age children in the household to separately affect children’s activi-
ties, while the gender-birth spacing order may not represent a relevant
issue.
Our dependent variables are the household rates of children’s school
attendance and child labor, since we have chosen to conduct our analysis
at the household level. This choice, while on the one hand, has the
TABLE 2
ACTIVITIES OF CHILDREN AGED 6–15 BY GENDER (%)
Child activities
Boys Girls
1993 1998 1993 1998
School only 58 74 55 73
Work and school 22 16 19 14
Work only 11 6 16 8
Neither school nor work 9 4 10 5
Note: calculated on the children of the panel households of the 1993 and 1998 surveys.
Source: VLSS 1993 and 1998.
TABLE 3
SCHOOLING AND LABOR OF A CHILD LIVING IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH MIXED-GENDER SCHOOL-AGE
SIBLINGS, 1998 (%)
Two-children
households
Three-children
households*
Three plus-children
households*
Oldest is
male
Oldest is
female
Oldest is
male
Oldest is
female
Oldest is
male
Oldest is
female
Schooling of
oldest sibling
72 65 53 53 51 46
Schooling of next
oldest sibling
82 87 76 81 71 74
Child labor of
oldest sibling
23 31 43 40 45 46
Child labor of next
oldest sibling
11 10 21 17 25 22
Number of
children
652 664 316 324 414 454
*Only cases where the second oldest is of different gender with respect to the first.
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING REMITTANCES AND DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL VALUE BETWEEN
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES
Source of remittances
Percent of households Percent of total value
1993 1998 1993 1998
Domestic remittances 13.5 14.6 30 40
International remittances 3.8 4.2 70 60
Note: calculated on 2,054 panel households.
Source: VLSS 1993 and 1998.
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disadvantage of leading to a loss of child-specific information, on the other
hand has the advantage of allowing us to sample all panel households with
children in the selected school-age range. If we had chosen to conduct a
child-specific analysis, given the time distance between the two surveys, our
sample would have been severely constrained by the limited number of
panel children who remain in the school-age range in both rounds of the
survey. In fact, in the five-year span between the two surveys, the most part
of children present in 1993 would have become older than 15, thus drop-
ping out of our sample. For similar reasons, Edmonds (2005) follows the
same strategy. Moreover, since a sibling effect does not seem to arise in
Vietnam, the loss of information on birth order, implied by the choice to
conduct the analysis at the household level, should not represent a problem
here.
Our definitions of Child Labor and Schooling are taken from the sec-
tions dedicated to employment and education, respectively, in the 1993
and 1998 VLSS questionnaires. We consider a child as engaging in labor
if they answered “yes” to at least one of the three questions related to
“employment during the past seven days,” specifically: “have you worked
for pay for someone not a member of your household?”; “did you work
in a field [. . .] or raise livestock [. . .] or process home-produced crops for
your household?”; and “have you worked in a business managed by your-
self or by your household?” As far as schooling is concerned, we consider
a child as only going to school if they answered “yes” to the question “are
you currently attending school?” (including those on summer breaks) and
“no” to all of the above questions on employment.
More precisely, in our econometric model for each household i:
Child Labori ¼
XJ
j¼1 yij=J
where the j index refers to the jth child in the household, J is the total
number of children aged six to 15 in household i, and yij = 1 if child j
does any form of work in agriculture, in the household business, or in the
labor market for a wage, notwithstanding the fact that she/he might also
be attending school. It follows that 0 ≤ Child Labor ≤ 1 for each family i.
The other dependent variable, Schooling, is calculated in an analogous way.
It equals one when all children in the household go to school and do not
perform any kind of work and zero when no child is only going to school
without being engaged in some form of labor. Finally, 0 < Schooling ≤ 1
if at least one child is attending school without working.
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According to our definition, therefore, Child Labor/Schooling are the
probabilities of child labor/school attendance within the household.
The econometric specification for the cross section is the following:
Child Labori ¼ aþ bXi þ c
X
j
zij=J
 
þ ei
Schoolingi ¼ dþ gXi þ /ð
X
j
zij=J Þ þ gi
where Xi are household’s characteristics and zij are household i children’s
characteristics, e and g are random error terms.
In the panel analysis, we take advantage of the longitudinal nature
of the data by estimating the following fixed-effects models:
Child Laborit ¼ aþ hi þ bXit þ cð
X
j
zijt=J Þ þ vit
and
Schoolingit ¼ dþ xi þ gXit þ /ð
X
j
zijt=J Þ þ nit
where t denotes time, hi and xi are the unobservable household fixed
effects and vit and ξit are the remainder disturbance terms.
With proportions as dependent variables, we need to estimate the
models with nonlinear techniques. We apply two estimation techniques
that allow us to compare the cross-sectional and the panel results, since
they are both tailored to deal with proportions as dependent variables.
For the cross section, a suitable model is the binomial logit, an estimation
method for grouped data, where, for each household, the dependent
variable is split into two variables, namely the number of children
who work/attend school and the number of children aged six to 15 living
in the household.3
With panel data, we apply a two-sided censored regression with fixed
effects (Alan et al. 2014). Alan et al. (2014) formulate the two-sided
censored regression model as observations of (Y; x;L;U) from the model:
3This amounts to estimate a maximum-likelihood logit model on “grouped” data. The
estimation has been performed using the “blogit” command in the STATA software.
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Y it ¼ x 0itbþ eit
where Y* is unobserved but we observe:
Yit ¼
0 if Y it\0
Y it 0Y it  1
1 if Y it [ 1
8<
:
and b is the parameter of interest. When Y is a share, L and U will typi-
cally be 0 and 1, respectively.
This estimation technique starts with a comparison of two observa-
tions for a given individual in a panel, and then constructs recensored
residuals on which moment conditions are based to identify the parame-
ters of interest (Honore and Powell 1994).4
The vector Xi of household variables contains the two explanatory
variables of interest, namely the logarithm of the value of domestic remit-
tances and the logarithm of the value of international remittances, both of
them measured at the household level i. They are the logarithm of the
amount of money (in Vietnamese Dongs) received by each household
from members who have left the household to migrate. Remittances are
defined in a special section5 on “income from remittances” in both the
1993 and 1998 VLSS questionnaires as “the amount of money and mone-
tary value of in-kind benefits received by a household from people not liv-
ing in the household, including family and friends, which do not require
repayment.” A question about the place of residence of the remitter (ei-
ther “province in Vietnam” or “abroad”) allows us to distinguish between
internal and international remittances. The summary statistics of our two
dependent variables and of all explanatory variables are presented in
Table 4.
The first two figures in Table 4 show the average household inci-
dence of child labor and school attendance. In 1993, in each house-
hold on average 64 percent of children were only going to school,
while 25 percent of them were either studying and working or only
4See pages 6–7, equations 3–5, of Alan et al. (2014) for an intuition of this method. The
estimation has been performed using the “two-side” STATA routine which calculates the
estimator developed in Alan et al. 2014. (http://www.princeton.edu/~honore/stata/
index.html#1._Pantob_version_0.6).
5See Section 13, part a, of the questionnaire.
INTERNAL VERSUS INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 11INTERNAL ERSUS I L IGRATION 53
working. In 1998, the proportion of children engaged in some form of
labor is practically the same, but the average proportion of children
only going to school declines to 58 percent. This could be due to the
fact that, in our 1998 sample, there are fewer children of primary
school age (who are generally more likely to only go to school) com-
pared to the 1993 sample. These proportions may change because of
the change in children’s age between the first and second wave. In fact,
the Average age of children in the household increases from 9.57 years in
1993 to 11.67 years in 1998, thus overcoming the threshold at which
Vietnamese children finish primary school (in Vietnam, primary school
starts at six years of age and lasts five years). This detectable effect of
the increase in children’s average age highlights the substantial length
of time, five years, that passed between these two rounds of the VLSS.
TABLE 4
SUMMARY STATISTICS: CHILD LABOR, CHILD SCHOOLING, REMITTANCES, AND OTHER CONTROL VARIABLES
IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN AGED 6–15
Variables
Mean
Standard
deviation
1993 1998 1993 1998
Dependent variables
Child Labor (proportion of working children) 0.25 0.25 0.34 0.37
Schooling (proportion of children attending school) 0.64 0.58 0.39 0.48
Explanatory Variables
Log of the value of domestic remittances* 8.17 7.99 2.69 3.07
Log of the value of international remittances* 8.87 8.77 1.77 2.10
Proportion of male children in the household 0.51 0.52 0.38 0.38
Average age of children in the household 9.57 11.67 2.01 1.95
Recipient is migrant’s parent or grandparent 0.03 0.05 0.16 0.21
Gender of the household head (1 is male) 0.81 0.80 0.39 0.40
Household head: low level of education 0.37 0.26 0.48 0.44
Household head: medium level of education 0.10 0.48 0.30 0.50
Household head: high level of education 0.06 0.20 0.24 0.40
Household head: age 30–50 years 0.37 0.73 0.48 0.44
Household head: age over 50 years 0.08 0.26 0.27 0.44
Size of the household 5.97 5.70 1.96 1.81
Number of children in the household 2.27 2.14 1.07 1.05
Urban household 0.17 0.19 0.37 0.39
Expenditure quintile 2 0.23 0.21 0.42 0.41
Expenditure quintile 3 0.20 0.21 0.40 0.41
Expenditure quintile 4 0.18 0.20 0.38 0.40
Expenditure quintile 5 (top) 0.16 0.17 0.37 0.38
Number of Observations: 2,054 2,054
*Through the transformation formula employed to generate the logarithms, all amounts equaling zero were replaced
by a (very small) negative number. The means shown in include both recipients and non-recipient households and
this explains their negative values.
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Therefore, controlling for children’s average age should tackle the prob-
lem of aging in the panel analysis.
The rest of the summary statistics associated with children show the
figures emerging from our choice of averaging the child’s profile. In par-
ticular, since we are employing the household average values of children’s
characteristics, age is represented by the Average age of children in the
household and gender by the Proportion of males in the household. Besides
the dummy variable associated with the gender of the household head, we
are using “level of education” and “age group” of the household head,
which are expressed by three dummies and two dummies, respectively.
The reference base for education is “no qualification obtained” and the
three levels represent primary school (low education), secondary school
(medium), and college or university (high). For the age group, the refer-
ence base is “under 30 years of age.” Using these age cohorts instead of a
continuous age variable allows us to distinguish between relatively younger
and older households heads, which are likely to have specific attitudes
toward children.
The number of children in the household and household size are
two other crucial variables included in the analysis.6
Another dummy captures the urban/rural location of the household.
As a measure of household wealth, we are employing the VLSS expendi-
ture data, sorted into five quintile ranks, through the use of four dummy
variables (first poorest quintile as reference). Although it would have been
more valuable for our analysis to use a measure of total household
income, given its influence on child labor and schooling (see for example
De Carvalho Filho 2012), there is no such information in the 1993 and
1998 VLSS datasets.
Also at variance with other studies, the data allow us to control for
whether or not the people who received the remittances were the
migrants’ parents or grandparents, thus relatively older members of the
household. The presence of this variable enriches the pool of information
on remittances in our model. In a preliminary analysis, we have also
tested out some alternative remittance variables, exploiting the wealth of
6In a preliminary analysis, we had also included the variable “dependency ratio” (ratio of
adults over 60 plus children below 15 divided by total number of household members),
since the number of dependents may affect the amount of remittances and indirectly
impact child schooling/labor decisions. We do not include it here since it turned out not
to be significant (except for a negative coefficient for schooling in 1998 which is significant
at 10 percent).
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data in the VLSS surveys. For instance, we find no significant impacts on
child labor and schooling associated with women receiving larger shares of
remittances.
Taking advantage of the information on the place of residence, we
also control for clustered standard errors at the village level.
RESULTS
The descriptive evidence we have just discussed seems to indicate a general
improvement of children’s welfare in the period studied. In the next sec-
tion, we present the results of our test on whether a positive correlation
exists between these improvements and the simultaneous presence of
remittances.
In this section, we present the results of the cross-sectional and panel
analyses.
Cross-Sectional Results
Table 5, which shows the results of the binomial logit regressions sepa-
rately for 1993 and 1998, suggests that remittances played some part in
reducing Child Labor, in both 1993 and 1998.
The coefficients of the logarithms have a negative sign, as expected:
Children are less likely to be engaged in labor activities if their household
is a recipient of remittances. However, the level of statistical significance is
very low for all coefficients apart from the international remittance one in
1998. Domestic remittances do not seem to play a substantial role, being
insignificant in both years. Also note that our additional remittance vari-
able, which controls for the migrant’s relationship with the recipient of
remittances in the household, is insignificant.
From the examination of the other explanatory variables, we notice
that, in both years, older children and children living in rural areas were
more likely to work. We also notice that while an increasing overall size of
the household reduced the child’s probability to work, with older members
available to work, a higher number of children in the household caused a
rise in child labor, especially in 1993. As for the gender aspects, in 1993 the
higher the Proportion of males in the household, the lower the probability of
Child Labor, while in 1998 this coefficient is not significant.
We have also estimated the model pooling the two cross sections.
The coefficient of the dummy Year (equal to one in 1998 and to zero in
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1993) in column (3), capturing the effect of some fixed determinants that
are unspecified in the model, shows that in 1998 it was significantly less
probable that children were engaged in child labor. To test for equality of
specific coefficients between 1993 and 1998, we have estimated the pooled
model also including all interactions with the dummy Year. The only fully
significant (and negative) coefficients that reject the hypothesis of equality
TABLE 5
HOUSEHOLD CHILD LABOR IN 1993 AND 1998. BINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES
(1) (2) (3)
1993 1998 Pooled sample
Coefficients (SE) Coefficients (SE) Coefficients (SE)
Log of the value of domestic
remittances
0.0175 (0.0198) 0.0103 (0.018) 0.0138 (0.0137)
Log of the value of
international remittances
0.0308 (0.0286) 0.0896*** (0.0317) 0.0642*** (0.210)
Proportion of male children
in the household
0.2834** (0.1296) 0.1585 (0.1423) 0.2169** (0.0999)
Average age of children in the
household
0.9642*** (0.2135) 0.9949*** (0.3166) 0.9525*** (0.1514)
Average age of children in the
household squared
0.0273*** (0.0102) 0.0270** (0.0136) 0.0260*** (0.0068)
Recipient is migrant’s parent
or grandparent
0.0385 (0.3469) 0.0863 (0.2749) 0.0188 (0.02166)
Gender of the household
head
0.0303 (0.1316) 0.0143 (0.1503) 0.0191 (0.1098)
Household head: low level of
education
0.0529 (0.0976) 0.0844 (0.1732) 0.0311 (0.8734)
Household head: medium
level of education
0.4503*** (0.1403) 0.0284 (0.1931) 0.1916* (0.1159)
Household head: high level of
education
0.0186 (0.2040) 0.1733 (0.2180) 0.1800 (0.1451)
Household head: age 30–
50 years
0.0257 (0.0849) 0.4145 (0.4461) 0.0595 (0.0849)
Household head: age over
50 years
0.0297 (0.2082) 0.4913 (0.4543) 0.0944 (0.1342)
Size of the household 0.0836*** (0.0305) 0.0716** (0.0366) 0.0771*** (0.0255)
Number of children in the
household
0.1293** (0.0585) 0.0957** (0.0497) 0.1091*** (0.0396)
Urban household 0.9111*** (0.2253) 1.2340*** (0.2708) 1.0593*** (0.2053)
Expenditure quintile 2 0.0736 (0.1170) 0.4078*** (0.1249) 0.2351*** (0.0883)
Expenditure quintile 3 0.3470*** (0.1260) 0.6124*** (0.1499) 0.4720*** (0.1000)
Expenditure quintile 4 0.8192*** (0.1297) 1.1035*** (0.1611) 0.9534*** (0.1080)
Expenditure quintile 5 (top) 1.1508*** (0.1700) 1.8281*** (0.2476) 1.4320*** (0.1498)
Year (1998 = 1) – – 0.8719*** (0.1173)
Number of Observations:
2,054 households
4,659 children 4,395 children 9,054 children
R2 0.1064 0.1108 0.1064
Notes: Equality of coefficient between 1993 and 1998 is rejected for: Expenditure quintile 2 (coeff. 0.34; SE:
0.17; t: 2.07) and Expenditure quintile 5 (top): coeff. 0.69; SE: 0.28; t: 2.42.
Significance levels = ***(p < 0.01), **(p < 0.05), *(p < 0.1). Cluster-Robust Standard Errors in brackets.
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of coefficients in the two years are those of the interactions with the bot-
tom and top quintiles of expenditure. This evidence shows that, while
moving from lower to higher expenditure quintiles reduced the probabil-
ity of working in the two years, in 1993 the passage from the bottom
quintile to the second does not have a significant impact. We have shown
that people in the lowest quintile were poorer in 1993 than in 1998 and
this is confirmed by our results, which seem to highlight a general
improvement of the economic situation.
As for Schooling (see Table 6), only the coefficient of the logarithm
of international remittances for 1998 is positive and statistically signifi-
cant, indicating that only international remittances have an impact on
children’s school attendance. Our additional remittance variable concern-
ing the recipient’s relationship with the migrant member is not
significant.
From the analysis of the other control variables, it emerges that the
urban/rural difference reflects the patterns noticed in the child labor esti-
mation, with children in rural areas still clearly worse off in both years.
Finally, as expected, belonging to a household in higher expenditure quin-
tiles increased the children’s probability to go to school in the two years
observed. As for gender, males have a higher probability of schooling in
1993. The number of children in the household has a negative and highly
significant coefficient in both years. Moreover, the test for equality of
specific coefficients between 1993 and 1998 shows that Number of chil-
dren in the household has a significantly more negative coefficient in 1998.
The detrimental effect of a high number of school-age children in the
household, already appearing at a descriptive level (see Table 3), is there-
fore confirmed by the cross-sectional analysis.
Panel Results
Despite the presence of numerous control variables, the use of cross-sec-
tional data runs the risk of omitted variable bias in the estimated coeffi-
cients relating to remittances. As previously discussed, in Vietnam the
decision to migrate toward the United States has its roots in political fac-
tors. The migration flow started at the time of the Vietnam war for political
reasons has contributed to create a migration network among the subse-
quent generations of Vietnamese households. Since the VLSS survey does
not contain information on migration networks, the problem of unob-
served variables that bias the estimates may arise. Panel data estimation
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methods, allowing for unobserved fixed effects that may be correlated with
the decision to migrate and, therefore, with international and domestic
remittances, help solving this problem. Fixed-effects estimation methods
seem to be a suitable way to correctly estimate the relative importance of
domestic versus international remittances for children’s outcomes.
Table 7 presents the results of the two-sided censoring model with
fixed effects estimated on the panel data.
TABLE 6
HOUSEHOLD CHILD SCHOOLING IN 1993 AND 1998. BINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES
(1) (2) (3)
1993 1998 Pooled sample
Coefficients (SE) Coefficients (SE) Coefficients (SE)
Log of the value of domestic
remittances
0.0167 (0.0175) 0.0245 (0.0211) 0.0194 (0.0146)
Log of the value of
international remittances
0.0454 (0.0278) 0.0988*** (0.0338) 0.0740*** (0.0215)
Proportion of male children
in the household
0.1965* (0.1187) 0.0334 (0.1634) 0.1352 (0.1030)
Average age of children in the
household
0.4596** (0.2077) 1.1229** (0.4943) 0.2516 (0.1724)
Average age of children in the
household squared
0.0361*** (0.0102) 0.0343 (0.0212) 0.0008 (0.0078)
Recipient is migrant’s parent
or grandparent
0.2278 (0.3121) 0.2473 (0.3602) 0.0787 (0.2499)
Gender of the household head 0.0722 (0.1174) 0.02151 (0.1682) 0.0698 (0.1116)
Household head: low level of
education
0.0397 (0.0878) 0.212 (0.2877) 0.0173 (0.0748)
Household head: medium
level of education
0.0120 (0.1300) 0.4528 (0.2926) 0.2202 (0.1180)
Household head: high level of
education
0.4915** (0.2055) 0.3960 (0.3158) 0.3037* (0.1464)
Household head: age 30–
50 years
0.1144 (0.0855) 0.4853 (0.7518) 0.0716 (0.0812)
Household head: age over
50 years
0.1419 (0.1906) 0.5444 (0.7585) 0.1789 (0.1358)
Size of the household 0.0179 (0.0284) 0.0605 (0.0430) 0.0341 (0.0276)
Number of children in the
household
0.08219 (0.0615) 0.4330*** (0.1059) 0.2313*** (0.0651)
Urban household 0.7318*** (0.1782) 0.9429*** (0.2389) 0.8188*** (0.1721)
Expenditure quintile 2 0.4840*** (0.1136) 0.5003*** (0.1728) 0.4814*** (0.1093)
Expenditure quintile 3 0.7781*** (0.1202) 0.8602*** (0.1928) 0.8241*** (0.1138)
Expenditure quintile 4 1.2640*** (0.1202) 1.2404*** (0.2104) 1.2657*** (0.1251)
Expenditure quintile 5 (top) 1.6384*** (0.1528) 2.0827*** (0.2771) 1.8289*** (0.1559)
Year (1998 = 1) 0.1592 (0.1145)
Number of Observations
2,054 households
4,659 children 4,395 children 9,054 children
R2 0.1065 0.1590 0.1250
Notes: Equality of coefficient between 1993 and 1998 is rejected for: Number of children in the household (coeff.
0.35; SE 0.12; t: 2.84); Age (coef. 1.58; SE 0.53; t 2.97); Age squared (coeff. 0.07; SE 0.02; t: 3.02).
Significance levels = ***(p < 0.01), **(p < 0.05), *(p < 0.1); Cluster-Robust Standard Errors in brackets.
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The most striking result is that only the domestic component of
remittances appears to have significant positive effects for child well-being:
children are less likely to work and more likely attend school if the house-
hold receives domestic remittances. This is in contrast with our cross-sec-
tional results and with much of previous research on the subject.
A possible interpretation of this result might be that international
migrants find it more difficult to maintain close relationships with their
families, since their visits to their countries of origin are infrequent.
Hence, the negative side effects determined by lack of parental care for
the children left behind might outpace the benefits generated by receiving
international remittances.
From the econometric point of view, the result emerging from the
cross-sectional analysis may simply be due to the problem of omitted
variables. International migrants and their families of origin are usually
better-off and more educated than the average; thus, the positive and
significant impact of international remittances observed in the cross
section is likely to be the result of unobservable factors. In fact, receiving
remittances may be endogenous: recipient households may have
TABLE 7
HOUSEHOLD CHILD LABOR AND SCHOOLING. TWO-SIDED CENSORING MODEL WITH FIXED EFFECTS
Child labor Schooling
Coefficients (SE) Coefficients (SE)
Log of the value of domestic remittances 0.0161** (0.0073) 0.0302* (0.0173)
Log of the value of international remittances 0.0099 (0.0143) 0.0125 (0.0192)
Proportion of male children in the household 0.0932 (0.0781) 0.4797*** (0.1821)
Average age of children in the household 0.2572*** (0.0906) 0.0228 (0.2505)
Average age of children in the household squared 0.005 (0.0041) 0.0117 (0.0112)
Recipient is migrant’s parent or grandparent 0.1339 (0.1291) 0.2941 (0.2067)
Gender of the household head 0.1167 (0.0929) 0.4079 (0.2840)
Household head: low level of education 0.0811** (0.0382) 0.0387 (0.1074)
Household head: medium level of education 0.1367** (0.0576) 0.0469 (0.1519)
Household head: high level of education 0.2251 (0.0875) 0.0333 (0.2082)
Household head: age 30–50 years 0.0699 (0.0547) 0.003 (0.0968)
Household head: age over 50 years 0.1258 (0.0984) 0.0074 (0.1629)
Size of the household 0.0056 (0.0211) 0.0649 (0.0495)
Number of children in the household 0.068*** (0.0259) 0.3471*** (0.0702)
Urban household 0.1661 (0.2989) 0.6994 (0.5949)
Expenditure quintile 2 0.0152 (0.0466) 0.0570 (0.1130)
Expenditure quintile 3 0.0598 (0.0589) 0.1415 (0.1192)
Expenditure quintile 4 0.077 (0.0792) 0.3120* (0.1767)
Expenditure quintile 5 (top) 0.078 (0.1161) 0.0373 (0.2377)
Year (1998 = 1) 0.132** (0.0555) 0.0018 (0.1172)
Notes: Number of Observations: 4,108. Number of Groups: 2,054. Child Labor: Frac. Cen. Above (Yit = 0): 0.60;
Frac. Cen. Below (Yit = 1): 0.13. Schooling: Frac. Cen. Above (Yit = 0): 0.29; Frac. Cen. Below (Yit = 1): 0.51.
Significance levels = ***(p < 0.01), **(p < 0.05), *(p < 0.1). Cluster-Robust Standard Errors in brackets.
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characteristics correlated to receiving remittances that make them more
likely to send/not to send their children to school/to work. This may be
more likely in households where some members have migrated abroad,
and where overseas migration was mainly driven by political factors, as in
the case of Vietnam. Our two-sided regression method with fixed-effects
enables us to control for the time-invariant unobserved characteristics and
to tackle the endogeneity problem of the migration decision.
As for the other significant coefficients, schooling appears to be more
probable for males and work more probable for older children.
Consistent with the descriptive evidence of Table 3 and the cross-
sectional results, an increasingly large number of children in the
household appears to produce a significant detrimental effect on both our
measures of child well-being. In order to understand whether this effect is
more pronounced for girls than boys or the other way around, we have
also estimated the model by gender. In this case, the dependent variables
become the proportions of male/female attending school/working over the
total number of males/females in the household. Table 8 reports the esti-
mated coefficients of Number of children in the household. As for the posi-
tive and significant effect on child labor, the number of siblings in the
household does not seem to have a clear gender-specific pattern over time
and in the panel analysis. Instead, as far as schooling is concerned, the
negative effect appearing in Table 7 is driven by boys. This is an interest-
ing result that makes Vietnam quite different from other developing coun-
tries where girls experience more difficulties than boys. As far as the
impact of remittances is concerned, no specific gender-specific pattern can
be derived, also because the reduction in the number of observations
when estimating by gender makes the number of household receiving
remittances too low for statistical precision.
As far as household indicators of education are concerned, the more
educated the household head, the lower probability of the average child
going to work, but increasing education levels of the household head have
no significant impact on children’s probability to attend school. At vari-
ance with the cross-sectional results, although the coefficients associated
with the household expenditure quintiles bear the expected signs, only the
coefficient of the fourth quintile shows a significant positive impact on
child schooling. Also in this case, controlling for the fixed effects has sig-
nificantly changed the results, confirming household expenditure to be a
poorer indicator of household economic status with respect to household
total income.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the large body of literature dealing with the increasing importance of
remittance flows for developing countries, the number of studies that
investigate the specific impact of domestic and international remittances
on child well-being remains limited. We have attempted to explore this
crucial relationship by separately taking into account the effects of remit-
tances on child labor and on school attendance. The analysis of the differ-
ence between the effects of domestic and international remittances,
separating their respective values, has highlighted the greater importance
of internal flows of remittances for child well-being.
The largest part of the existing literature on this subject is based on
cross-sectional data. The evidence emerging from the majority of these
analyses seems to indicate that remittances matter for child well-being,
but international remittances matter more than domestic remittances.
Therefore, our main objective was to ascertain whether this result is con-
firmed when unobservable fixed effects are taken into account.
Using panel data from the 1993 and 1998 VLSS, we have compared
the results derived from our cross-sectional analysis with those of our
panel analysis. We have employed an estimation procedure that focuses
on the average characteristics of all children belonging to each household,
thus generating an average representative child at the household level. Our
findings show, in line with the literature, that children belonging to recip-
ient households are less likely to be sent to work and more likely to
TABLE 8
COEFFICIENTS OF NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN THE HOUSEHOLD BY GENDER
Child labor Schooling
Males Females Males Females
1993 1993
0.1607*** 0.1344** 0.1730*** 0.0265
(0.0567) (0.0571) (0.0524) (0.0533)
1998 1998
0.1277* 0.1725*** 0.2397*** 0.0973
(0.0708) (0.0694) (0.066) (0.0633)
Panel Panel
0.02619** 0.0207* 0.0481*** 0.0045
(0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0129) (0.0128)
Note: The cross-sectional coefficients are estimated with bilogit. Since the two-sided censoring model did not con-
verge, the panel coefficients are estimated with the linear probability model with fixed effects. All other control vari-
ables of Tables 5–7 are included. Significance levels = ***(p<0.01), **(p<0.05), *(p<0.1). Standard errors in
parenthesis.
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attend school than children who live in households where this source of
income is absent.
However, although at the cross-sectional levels receiving international
remittances appears to have a stronger effect than receiving domestic
remittances, this difference is reversed in our panel analysis. After control-
ling for time-invariant unobservable characteristics with a fixed-effects
model, domestic remittances are found to be the only significant inflow of
migrants’ money to reduce child labor and increase school attendance. In
line with the evidence found in studies on the negative effects of parental
absence on the well-being of children, we attribute the result of the
insignificant effect of international remittances to the lack of parental care
for children left behind in migrants’ households of origin. Internal
migrants, unlike international migrants, are likely to preserve a relatively
close relationship with their families of origin, thus maintaining control
over their children’s welfare and the way in which remittances are spent.
On the econometric side, the significant impacts of international
remittances observed in the cross-sectional analyses were probably due to
unobserved household factors. These factors were removed in the panel
analysis which, we believe, achieves a better understanding of the complex
relationship between receiving remittances and children’s well-being.
The importance of facilitating labor movement, especially within
national borders, appears to be the main policy implication stemming
from our findings. When people are free to migrate between provinces,
often from rural to urban areas, they can sustain the welfare of their chil-
dren left behind by sending domestic remittances while continuing to
have a good oversight of their activities. At the same time, the highlighted
downsides related to international migration should be tackled with a set
of policies aimed at providing care to children with migrant parents living
abroad. This would make the impacts of international remittances more
effective and beneficial for children’s well-being.
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